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“AGING OUT” OF IMMIGRATION:  
ANALYZING FAMILY PREFERENCE VISA 
PETITIONS UNDER THE CHILD STATUS 
PROTECTION ACT 
Christina A. Pryor*
 
 
In the late 1990s, extensive backlogs and delays by U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services in processing family-based visa petitions caused 
many children to “age out” of immigration eligibility and face separation 
from their families.  To rectify this problem, on August 6, 2002, Congress 
enacted the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA), which permits an applicant 
to retain classification as a “child” for immigration purposes, even if he or 
she has reached the age of twenty-one.  The CSPA “freezes” the age of the 
applicant through a mathematical formula that allows the time that a visa 
petition was pending to be subtracted from his or her age. 
In Matter of Wang, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) limited the 
applicability of section 203(h)(3) of the CSPA to certain family-based visa 
petitions.  This Note focuses on the subsequent circuit split between the 
Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits over whether the BIA’s decision in Wang 
should be given deference under the standard set forth in Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.  Ultimately, this Note 
endorses the Ninth Circuit’s recent holding in Cuellar de Osorio v. 
Mayorkas.  This Note contends that section 203(h)(3) is ambiguous under 
the first prong of Chevron analysis.  Applying Chevron’s second prong, this 
Note argues that the BIA’s construction of the statute represents a 
reasonable policy decision for the agency to make and thus merits 
deference. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On May 5, 1998, Rosalina Cuellar de Osorio’s mother, a U.S. citizen, 
filed an F31 family visa petition on her daughter’s behalf.2  Cuellar de 
Osorio’s then-thirteen-year-old son was listed as a derivative beneficiary on 
the petition, which made him eligible to immigrate with his mother.3  By 
the time Cuellar de Osorio’s priority date became current4
 
 1. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 seven years later, 
 2. Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 656 F.3d 954, 957–58 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 3. See id. at 958. 
 4. Due to the limited number of visas, a “waiting list” system based on the date an 
individual’s petition is properly filed—referred to as the priority date—is used to determine 
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on November 1, 2005, her son had “aged out” of derivative status.5  At the 
age of twenty-one, he was no longer considered a child under American 
immigration law and could not accompany his mother to the United States.6
After Cuellar de Osorio became a legal permanent resident
 
7 (LPR) based 
on her mother’s petition, she then filed a F2B visa petition (for adult sons or 
daughters of LPRs) listing her son as a beneficiary.8  She requested 
retention of the original F3 petition’s priority date for the new F2B petition, 
which would enable her son to immigrate years earlier than if he was 
assigned a more recent priority date based on the F2B petition’s filing date.9  
When U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied this 
request, Cuellar de Osorio and other similarly situated plaintiffs filed suit 
against the agency in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of 
California.10
Immigrants such as Rosalina Cuellar de Osorio have brought federal 
lawsuits alleging that USCIS has misinterpreted a provision of the Child 
Status Protection Act of 2002
 
11 (CSPA) by refusing to grant age-out 
protection for their alien12 relatives.  One immigration attorney has 
estimated that 20,000 immigrants in the United States face separation from 
their aged-out children.13  Some immigrants, such as Cuellar de Osorio, 
have left their adult children in their home countries after years of waiting 
for visas because the children aged out of immigration eligibility.14
 
each visa petitioner’s place in line and to distribute the visas as they become available to the 
next person in line. See Visa Availability & Priority Dates, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. 
SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (follow “Green Card (Permanent 
Residence)” hyperlink; then follow “Green Card Processes & Procedures” hyperlink) (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2012).  A priority date “becomes current” when a visa becomes available to 
an immigrant, at which point he or she must submit a separate application in order to receive 
the visa. See Baruelo v. Comfort, No. 05 C 6659, 2006 WL 3883311, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 
29, 2006).  For a detailed account of this process, see infra Part I.B. 
  In at 
 5. See Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 958. 
 6. See id. 
 7. An LPR is a person who has been granted lawful permanent residence in the United 
States. See Randall Monger & James Yankay, U.S. Legal Permanent Residents:  2010, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY 1 (2011), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/
publications/lpr_fr_2010.pdf.  LPRs have the right to live and work anywhere in the United 
States, own property, attend public educational institutions, enlist in certain branches of the 
armed forces, and become U.S. citizens if they meet certain requirements. See id.  LPRs are 
commonly known as “green card holders,” a reference to the document a permanent resident 
carries to provide proof of his or her status. See RICHARD A. BOSWELL, ESSENTIALS OF 
IMMIGRATION LAW 189 (Stephanie L. Browning ed., 2006).  This card is officially known as 
an I-551, and is no longer green. Id. 
 8. See Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 958. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) (2006). 
 12. While the term “alien” has a pejorative connotation, this Note uses it because 
virtually all federal government documents and legal opinions employ it to refer to foreign-
born nationals who seek permanent residence in the United States. See ANNA O. LAW, THE 
IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN AMERICAN COURTS 1 n.1 (2010). 
 13. Immigrants Fight to Bring Adult Children to U.S., MSNBC (Aug. 25. 2009), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32556526/ns/us_newslife/t/immigrants-fight-bring-adult-
children-us/. 
 14. See, e.g., Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 955–56. 
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least one case, however, the aged-out aliens are already within the United 
States and face deportation proceedings.15
The U.S. Courts of Appeals disagree as to whether the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’s (BIA) interpretation of section 203(h)(3) of the 
CSPA was correct in Matter of Wang,
 
16 which prohibited the retention of 
visa priority dates for derivative beneficiaries of F2B, F3 and F4 visa 
petitions.17  Each of the three circuit courts to consider this statutory issue 
thus far has based its analysis on Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.,18 evaluating whether deference to the BIA’s decision 
is appropriate.  The Second Circuit held that § 1153(h)(3), which codifies 
section 203(h)(3) of the CSPA, is unambiguous, and that no relief is 
available to aged-out aliens.  The court reasoned that aged-out aliens cannot 
retain their priority date if the visas cannot be converted to an appropriate 
category.19  In contrast, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the provision is 
ambiguous, and courts must therefore defer to the BIA’s holding in Wang, 
which the court determined was a permissible construction of the statute.20  
Most recently, the Fifth Circuit considered the applicability of § 1153(h)(3), 
and agreed with the Second Circuit that the provision is unambiguous.21  
The court held, however, that the statute allows all beneficiaries and 
derivative beneficiaries of family-based visa petitions to change petitioners 
and obtain age-out protection under the CSPA.22
This Note analyzes the recent treatment of § 1153(h)(3) in the circuit 
courts following the BIA’s decision in Wang.  It focuses on whether F2B, 
F3, and F4 petitions are entitled to age-out protection under the CSPA.  
This Note contends that courts should defer to the BIA’s interpretation of 
§ 1153(h)(3) under Chevron.  At Chevron Step One,
 
23 while the statute’s 
plain language is clear, the statutory provision at issue is ambiguous 
because its operation is not workable.  Therefore, it is necessary to proceed 
to Chevron Step Two.  Because the BIA’s decision in Wang is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute and is “a reasonable policy choice for 
the agency to make,”24
Part I of this Note explains the complicated framework of the 
immigration visa system, examines the enactment of the CSPA, and details 
the scope of judicial review of agency statutory interpretations, focusing on 
administrative deference under Chevron.  Part II describes the BIA’s 
 the agency’s interpretation is entitled to deference. 
 
 15. See Khalid v. Holder, 655 F.3d 363, 365–66 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 16. 25 I. & N. Dec. 28 (B.I.A. 2009). 
 17. See infra Part II.B.  While the BIA’s decision expressly discusses F4 visa petitions, 
in practice it excludes F2B and F3 petitions as well. See infra notes 180–84 and 
accompanying text. 
 18. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 19. Li v. Renaud, 654 F.3d 376, 382–85 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 20. Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 656 F.3d 954, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 21. Khalid v. Holder, 655 F.3d 363, 375 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 22. Id. at 374–75. 
 23. In Chevron, the Supreme Court established a two-step test to determine whether a 
court should defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers. Chevron, 467 U.S. 
at 842–43; see infra Part I.D.2.   
 24. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845. 
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position on the CSPA “age out” problem in Wang, before considering the 
three-way circuit split on the proper application of Chevron Step One 
analysis.  Part III first argues that the Ninth Circuit was correct in 
determining that the statutory language of the CSPA is ambiguous in 
practice.  It concludes that the BIA’s decision to limit § 1153(h)(3) to 
derivative beneficiaries of F2A petitions is reasonable and should therefore 
be deferred to by courts. 
I.  THE “AGE OUT” PROBLEM IN PRACTICE 
This part addresses the complex American immigration system and the 
relevance of the Child Status Protection Act to reserving minor aliens’ 
places in the visa line.  First, this part provides an overview of the actors 
within the U.S. visa process and describes the mechanics of the distribution 
of family-preference visas in particular.  It then explores the CSPA, 
considering the development of the bill, its legislative history, and the text 
in detail.  Finally, this part explains the theory underlying judicial review of 
agency statutory interpretations, in particular the concept of Chevron 
deference. 
A.  An Introduction to Immigration:  The Immigration and Nationality Act 
and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Until the nineteenth century, state and local laws were the principal 
sources of U.S. immigration regulation.25  Federal immigration laws took a 
piecemeal approach until 1952, when Congress enacted the Immigration 
and Nationality Act,26 which combined all prior immigration laws into one 
comprehensive statute.27  Although the INA has subsequently been 
amended many times, it remains the foundation of immigration law.28
Congress has broadly delegated the power to enforce federal immigration 
provisions.
 
29
 
 25. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE 
LAW & POLICY 2 (5th ed. 2009); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING:  THE LOST 
STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 21–26 (2006) (describing 
the shift from state to federal immigration regulation); Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of 
Others:  Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1729 (2010) 
(explaining how federal immigration laws only began to displace state laws following the 
Civil War). 
  This administrative authority has been transferred among 
numerous agencies over the past century.  The Treasury Department 
 26. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2006)). 
 27. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP:  PROCESS 
& POLICY 173 (6th ed. 2008). 
 28. Id. at 176–81 (describing extensive reforms in 1965 and 1976, new provisions on 
political asylum and refugees in 1980, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, the 
Immigration Act of 1990, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
of 1996, the USA Patriot Act, the Homeland Security Act, and the Real ID Act); CHARLES 
GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.03(1) (2004) (“[The INA] is still the 
basic statute dealing with immigration and nationality. The amendments have been fitted 
into the structure of the parent statute . . . .”). 
 29. See BOSWELL, supra note 7, at 1. 
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regulated federal immigration laws until 1903, at which point these 
responsibilities shifted to the Department of Commerce and Labor.30  The 
Department of Labor maintained control of immigration functions until 
1940, when the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) moved to the 
Department of Justice.31  Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act,32 which consolidated 
federal agencies with various national-security-related functions.33  This 
legislation transferred the former responsibilities of the INS into three 
immigration-related bureaus:  U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP).34  Although the Act transferred the 
enforcement and service entities of the INS to the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), the Department of Justice retained the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (EOIR), which focuses on adjudication.35
USCIS is responsible for the determination of immigration benefits such 
as naturalization, overseas adoptions, work-related visas, and the 
immigration of family members.
 
36  This Note focuses on USCIS’s power to 
process Form I-130 (Petition for Alien Relative) for immigrants who are 
outside of the United States, as well as Form I-485 (Adjustment of Status), 
which must accompany Form I-130, for those aliens who are already in the 
country.37
B.  The Visa Preference System 
 
1.  Immigration Categories and Quotas 
To enter and remain in the United States lawfully, an alien must possess 
a valid visa conferring immigrant or non-immigrant status.38
 
 30. See ALEINKOFF ET AL., supra note 
  Aliens 
seeking permanent residence in the United States fall into one of four 
primary categories:  (1) immigrants who have certain relatives who are U.S. 
citizens or LPRs (family-sponsored immigrants); (2) immigrants with 
desirable job skills and certain other qualifications (employment-based 
immigrants); (3) immigrants from countries with historically low 
immigration rates to the United States (diversity immigrants); and (4) those 
27, at 268–69. 
 31. See id. at 269. 
 32. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
 33. ALEINKOFF ET AL., supra note 27, at 269. 
 34. See id. at 269–75.  This Note uses “USCIS” to refer to both the INS prior to 
March 1, 2003, when the Homeland Security Act took effect, and the current USCIS within 
DHS. 
 35. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 5. 
 36. See What We Do, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/
portal/site/uscis (follow “About Us” hyperlink; then follow “What We Do” hyperlink) (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2012). 
 37. See Green Card-Based Forms, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (follow “Forms” hyperlink; then follow “Green Card-
Based Forms” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). 
 38. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)–(B) (2006). 
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with refugee or asylee status.39  The family-sponsored immigration process 
allows a U.S. citizen or LPR to file a Form I-130 petition on behalf of an 
alien relative.40  U.S. citizens may sponsor their immediate relatives,41 who 
are defined as spouses, parents, or unmarried children under the age of 
twenty-one.42  Such immediate relatives are exempt from the numeric limits 
that apply to other permanent resident visas.43  For other qualifying 
relatives of U.S. citizens, however, such as adult or married children, and 
for all qualifying relatives of LPRs, the number of annual immigrant visas 
is capped.44
The Immigration Act of 1990 specifies an annual limit of 416,000 to 
675,000 visas in the three preference categories:  family-sponsored, 
employment-based, and diversity.
 
45  Each of these three categories has its 
own interior cap, and some categories are subject to per-country limits.46  
Apart from immediate relatives of citizens, there are four family-sponsored 
preference categories that must receive at least 226,000 immigrant visas 
each year within the overall family-sponsored cap.47
 
  The INA establishes 
the following family-based preference categories: 
First Preference:  unmarried adult sons and daughters of U.S. citizens 
and their children (23,400 visas per year); 
 
Second Preference:  spouses and unmarried minor children of LPRs (2A) 
and unmarried adult sons and daughters of LPRs (2B) (114,200 total for this 
category plus any visas above the 226,000 minimum for the family-
sponsored preferences that are unused by immediate relatives of citizens; at 
least seventy-seven percent of the second preference category must be 
allocated to F2A visas); 
 
Third Preference:  married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens (23,400); 
 
 39. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 253–54. 
 40. See § 1153(a). 
 41. §§ 1153(a), 1154(a)(1)(A)(i). 
 42. A “child” is defined under the INA as an unmarried person under the age of twenty-
one.  After a child turns twenty-one, he or she is then considered a “son” or “daughter.” 
§ 1101(b). 
 43. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).  The admittance of immediate relatives has increased 
significantly in recent decades, from nearly 80,000 in 1970 to over 480,000 in 2008. DAVID 
WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 143 
(6th ed. 2011). 
 44. § 1153(a). 
 45. See § 1153(a), (c). 
 46. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 253. 
 47. § 1151(c).  In order to calculate the quota for the family-sponsored preference 
categories, the number of immediate relatives who immigrated in the previous fiscal year is 
subtracted from the total allocation of 480,000.  The number of unused employment-based 
visas is then added to that amount. Id.  Although this quota must be at least 226,000—due to 
high levels of immigration by immediate relatives—it is unusual for it to surpass the 
statutory minimum. WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 43, at 153. 
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Fourth Preference:  brothers and sisters of adult U.S. citizens (65,000).48
 
 
These numbers represent the worldwide ceilings for the family-sponsored 
preference program; however, this category is also subject to per-country 
limits.49  For purposes of those limits, an immigrant is “charged” to the 
country in which he or she was born, with some exceptions.50  In general, 
the combined numbers of family-sponsored and employment-based 
immigrants from a single country in each fiscal year may not exceed 7 
percent of the combined worldwide limits for family-sponsored and 
employment-based immigrants.51  Immediate relatives and others exempt 
from the worldwide limitations, as well as F2A immigrants, are also exempt 
from per-country limitations.52
Finally, the INA provides for the immigration of spouses and children 
who are either “accompanying” or “following to join” the primary 
immigrant under the same visa preference category.
 
53  These immigrants, 
the spouses and children of primary beneficiaries, are referred to as 
“derivative beneficiaries.”54  Derivative beneficiaries are entitled to the 
same place in the visa line as the primary beneficiary, without the need to 
file a separate visa petition.55
2.  Moving Through the Visa Queue:  A Step-by-Step Checklist 
for the Family-Sponsored Immigrant 
 
The family visa preference process takes place in three steps.  First, the 
immigrant enters the visa line after a petition is submitted on her behalf.  If 
the petition is approved, the next step in the process is to determine where 
the immigrant may apply for the visa.  Finally, the petitioner is issued a visa 
and exits the line if she is admitted to the United States. 
The first step commences when the petitioner, a U.S. citizen or LPR, files 
a Form I-130 Petition for Alien Relative with USCIS on behalf of the 
 
 48. See § 1153(a)(1)–(4).  Grandparents, aunts, uncles, in-laws, and cousins cannot 
sponsor relatives for immigration. Family-Based Immigrant Visas, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFF., http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/types/types_1306.html 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2012).  There are further limits on which family members LPRs may 
petition for—married sons and daughters, parents, and siblings are all excluded. See 
§ 1153(a) (listing relationships recognized under the INA). 
 49. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 254. 
 50. Id.; § 1152(a)(2). 
 51. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 254. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 656 F.3d 954, 957 (9th Cir. 2011); see also 
§ 1153(d).  A person is considered to be “accompanying” if he or she immigrates within six 
months of the primary beneficiary’s immigration; otherwise, the individual is considered 
“following to join.” 22 C.F.R. § 40.1(a)(1) (2011).  Immigration-related statutes are found at 
8 U.S.C.  Regulations administering the functions of USCIS are found at 8 C.F.R. 
 54. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d).  There are no derivative beneficiaries for immediate relatives. 
See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(4) (2011). 
 55. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(4).  The total number of visas issued for that family count 
against the annual quota. BOSWELL, supra note 7, at 129. 
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beneficiary.56  The petitioner submits proof of her immigration status and 
requests that USCIS classify the beneficiary within one of the three 
immigrant relative categories recognized under the INA.57  Once the Form 
I-130 petition is prepared, the papers are mailed to a USCIS service center 
that has jurisdiction over the place of residence of the petitioner.58  USCIS 
then investigates the merits of the petition and determines the validity of the 
alleged familial relationship.59
If the petition is approved and the beneficiary is an immediate relative of 
a U.S. citizen, she may move to the next step in the process and be granted 
a visa.
 
60  Otherwise, if the I-130 petition establishes one of qualifying 
preference relationships, the beneficiary is granted a spot in line in the 
appropriate family-preference category.  The beneficiary’s place in line is 
determined by the “priority date,” which is the date the I-130 petition was 
filed on her behalf.61  Derivative beneficiaries are given the same priority 
date as the primary beneficiary.62
Because demand for family preference visas continuously surpasses the 
statutory ceiling in all categories, there are approximately 4.6 million 
pending visa applications.
 
63  The rate at which the line moves for each 
immigrant is contingent on numerous factors, including the visa category, 
the beneficiary’s country of citizenship, and the number of immigrants with 
earlier priority dates.64  Beneficiaries may wait a number of years before 
their priority dates become current and they may apply for visas.65  For 
example, visas are currently available for Filipino F4 beneficiaries with 
priority dates before October 8, 1988—in other words, Filipino brothers and 
sisters of U.S. citizens who have been waiting for over twenty-three years.66
 
 56. See I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (follow “Forms” hyperlink; then follow “Petition for 
Alien Relative” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). 
 
 57. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a), 1154(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(1)(B)(i)(I); 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(1). 
 58. 8 C.F.R. § 316.3. The statute states that the petition is filed with the “Attorney 
General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i).  However, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. 
L. No. 107-296, § 451(b), 116 Stat. 2135, 2196, transferred this authority to USCIS. 
 59. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b). 
 60. § 1204. 
 61. 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(c) (“The filing date of a petition shall be the date it is properly filed 
under paragraph (d) of this section and shall constitute the priority date.”). 
 62. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d). 
 63. See Annual Report of Immigrant Visa Applicants in the Family-Sponsored and 
Employment-Based Preferences Registered at the National Visa Center as of November 1, 
2011, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS 2 (Nov. 1, 2011), available at 
http://travel.state.gov/pdf/WaitingListItem.pdf. 
 64. See Evelyn H. Cruz, Because You’re Mine, I Walk the Line:  The Trials and 
Tribulations of the Family Visa Program, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 155, 158 (2010). 
 65. See Ogbolumani v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 523 F. Supp. 2d 864, 
869–70 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (“[D]ue to oversubscriptions in that visa preference category, visa 
numbers might not be immediately available for the alien relative . . . .”). 
 66. See Visa Bulletin for January 2012, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR 
AFFAIRS 2 (Dec. 8, 2011), available at http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/visabulletin/
visabulletin_Jan2012.pdf. 
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The State Department is responsible for administering the distribution of 
visas under the preference quota system.67  The State Department issues a 
Visa Bulletin each month, which reports cut-off dates that are currently 
being processed for each family preference category and country.68  If there 
is too much demand, the category or foreign country with excessive 
demand is then designated “oversubscribed.”69  The cut-off date for an 
oversubscribed category is the priority date of the first qualified visa 
applicant who fell outside of the numerical limits.70  Only a beneficiary 
with an approved visa petition with a priority date earlier than the cutoff 
date for her particular category and country is eligible for a visa number.71
Once the beneficiary’s priority date has become current, the next step is 
to determine where she can apply for the visa.
 
72  In general, there are two 
paths to LPR status depending on whether the applicant is living in the 
United States or another country at the time of application.73  If the 
beneficiary is in the United States and is eligible to adjust her status to that 
of an LPR, she may apply by submitting a Form I-485.74  At the time of this 
filing, there must be a visa number “immediately available” to the 
immigrant under the applicable quota availability and preference 
category.75  To qualify for adjustment of status, an applicant must have 
entered the United States lawfully, maintained lawful non-immigrant status, 
and refrained from engaging in unauthorized employment.76  Applicants for 
adjustment of status become LPRs of the United States and receive green 
cards when their applications are approved.77  USCIS has sole discretion to 
grant or deny an application for adjustment of status.78
 
 67. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(g). 
 
 68. See, e.g., Visa Bulletin for January 2012, supra note 66, at 1.  The left side of the 
visa bulletin shows the preference category, and the top of the bulletin indicates the country 
in which the prospective immigrant is from.  Only four individual countries are listed:  China 
(mainland born), India, Mexico, and the Philippines.  If the prospective immigrant is not 
from one of those four categories, she falls under the first column, which includes 
immigrants from “all chargeability areas except those listed.”  This allocation of visas by 
nationality is called “foreign state chargeability.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1152(b); 22 C.F.R. § 42.12 
(2011).  As a general rule, the term “chargeability” refers to the country where the alien was 
born, and not his current nationality. See BOSWELL, supra note 7, at 129. 
 69. Visa Bulletin for January 2012, supra note 66, at 1. In order to prevent an 
oversubscribed country’s immigration quota from being satisfied by immigrants in one 
preference category, the State Department divides that nation’s visa numbers by category so 
that they are in line with worldwide levels of immigration in that particular category. 
WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 43, at 151–52. 
 70. See Visa Bulletin for January 2012, supra note 66, at 1. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Visa Availability and Priority Dates, supra note 4. 
 73. Ogbolumani v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 523 F. Supp. 2d 864, 868–71 
(N.D. Ill. 2007). 
 74. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(iii) (2011); id. § 245.1. 
 75. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(2). 
 76. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255; BOSWELL, supra note 7, at 126.  For a detailed analysis of 
adjustment of status, see generally Lauren E. Sasser, Note, Waiting in Immigration Limbo:  
The Federal Court Split over Suits to Compel Action on Stalled Adjustment of Status 
Applications, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2511 (2008). 
 77. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(5)(ii). 
 78. 8 U.S.C. § 1255. 
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A person who does not qualify for adjustment of status in the United 
States must apply for an immigrant visa at the U.S. consulate in her country 
of origin, regardless of whether she resides in the United States.79  Once she 
is issued a visa, she may enter the United States and potentially become an 
LPR if admitted at a port of entry.80
Finally, the beneficiary must establish that she is not inadmissible in 
order to receive a visa.
 
81  This applies to beneficiaries who seek adjustment 
of status as well as those who are outside of the United States.82  When an 
application is complete, USCIS makes a decision whether to grant LPR 
status, and applicants receive notifications of these decisions by mail.83  A 
successful immigrant visa applicant becomes an LPR of the United States.84
Immigration eligibility is determined on the date of admission to the 
United States or the date of adjudication of an application to adjust status.
 
85  
A derivative beneficiary may lose her “following to join” status if the 
required relationship with the primary beneficiary is not preserved.86
3.  Now What?  Petition Denial, BIA Review, and the Road 
to Federal Court 
  Thus, 
because the classification of the child of a primary beneficiary is dependent 
on his or her legal status as a “child,” approval of the parent’s visa petition 
does not guarantee that the derivative beneficiary will ultimately be 
permitted to immigrate to the United States. 
If the initial I-130 petition is denied by USCIS, the petitioner may file an 
appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals.87
 
 79. § 1201(a)(1); see also Ogbolumani v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 523 F. 
Supp. 2d 864, 868–69 (N.D. Ill. 2007).  This path is also known as consular processing. See 
Consular Processing, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/
site/uscis (follow “Green Card” hyperlink; then follow “Consular Processing” hyperlink) 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2012). 
  The BIA is the highest 
 80. § 1255.  After a visa is granted, a foreign national may travel to a port of entry and 
request permission to enter the United States; however, a visa does not guarantee entry. See 
Family-Based Immigrant Visas, supra note 48. 
 81. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)(2).  Admission is defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the 
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 
§ 1101(a)(13)(A).  Grounds for inadmissibility under § 1182 include immigration violations, 
national security grounds, criminal grounds, public health-related grounds, and others. See 
LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 420. 
 82. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). 
 83. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(19) (2011). 
 84. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). 
 85. §§ 1182, 1255. 
 86. See 9 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 40.1 N7.1 (2010), 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86920.pdf.  Examples of failures 
to maintain this relationship include the death of a parent, the parent’s loss of status, or the 
derivative beneficiary’s marrying or aging out. Id.; see also Ward v. Att’y Gen., 608 F.3d 
1198, 1201–02 (11th Cir. 2010) (upholding the loss of derivative eligibility following the 
death of primary beneficiary parent); Khan, 14 I. & N. Dec. 122, 123–24 (B.I.A. 1972) 
(denying eligibility for derivative beneficiary wife and child due to death of primary 
beneficiary). 
 87. See Sano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 299 (B.I.A. 1985). 
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administrative body for decisions on immigration law.88  The beneficiary or 
derivative beneficiary cannot apply directly for review of his or her case.89  
There is also no form of administrative appeal if USCIS denies an alien’s 
Form I-485.90  A beneficiary or derivative beneficiary who has filed to 
adjust her status may only raise the issue before an immigration judge if 
DHS initiates removal proceedings.91  It is entirely within the discretion of 
DHS to commence these proceedings.92
The BIA hears appeals from immigration judges’ decisions in removal 
proceedings as well as appeals from certain USCIS decisions.
 
93  The Board 
may then issue a final administrative decision that is binding on all 
immigration judges, DHS officers, and DHS employees involved in that 
particular case.94  If the opinion is designated as precedential, it is binding 
in similar cases as well.95
There are two relevant avenues of review in the federal courts that 
immigrants have used to contest the BIA’s decision in Matter of Wang, 
depending on whether the aged-out alien is inside or outside of the country.  
First, aliens who are already present in the United States and who have been 
ordered removed by the BIA have submitted petitions for judicial review of 
the removal orders in the circuit in which the removal hearing was held.
 
96  
Second, parents who seek to be reunited with their aged-out children who 
have been left behind in their home country have filed suit in federal district 
court, alleging that the BIA has misinterpreted a provision of the Child 
Status Protection Act.97  These cases have then been appealed to the circuit 
courts.98
C.  The Child Status Protection Act 
 
The CSPA may be described as tolling a statute of limitations, as it 
“freezes” a child’s age when a visa petition is filed so that he or she does 
 
 88. Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/
biainfo.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2012).  The U.S. Attorney General has delegated to the 
BIA the power to exercise its “independent judgment and discretion in considering and 
determining the cases coming before [it].” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii). 
 89. See Sano, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 299. 
 90. Taing v. Chertoff, 526 F. Supp. 2d 177, 180 (D. Mass. 2007); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 245.2(a)(5)(ii). 
 91. For an in-depth discussion of removal (previously known as deportation) 
proceedings, see 8 C.F.R. § 240. 
 92. See, e.g., Cortez-Felipe v. INS, 245 F.3d 1054, 1057 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The Attorney 
General has discretion regarding when and whether to initiate deportation proceedings.”). 
 93. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 4. 
 94. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Khalid v. Holder, 655 F.3d 363, 366 (5th Cir. 2011).  Section 242 of the INA 
allows jurisdiction over these proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2). 
 97. See, e.g., Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 656 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 2011).  The 
district courts have subject matter jurisdiction to review Form I-130 petitions pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). 
 98. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). 
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not lose his or her immigration eligibility.99
1.  Enactment of the CSPA 
  Those challenging the BIA’s 
interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) have argued that the statutory 
provision not only freezes the ages of beneficiaries and derivative 
beneficiaries within the F2A category, but should also be extended to F2B, 
F3, and F4 petitions.  In order to fully comprehend the interpretive question 
confronted by the courts, it is essential to look at the statute’s enactment, 
legislative history, and text. 
On August 6, 2002, Congress enacted the CSPA100 in order to preserve 
the immigration eligibility of children who have “aged out” of their 
derivative status.101  Subsection (h)102
 
 99. See Shane Dizon, The Child Status Protection Act:  Does Immigration Math Solve 
the Family Unity Equation?, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 117, 134 (2004). 
 of the CSPA amended 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1153 by permitting children with timely filed family-based, employment-
based, and diversity visas submitted before they turned twenty-one to 
 100. Pub. L. No. 107-208, 116 Stat. 927 (2002). 
 101. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-45, at 2–3 (2001), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 640, 641–
642. 
 102. The specific language reads: 
(h) Rules for determining whether certain aliens are children 
(1) In general 
For purposes of subsections (a)(2)(A) and (d) of this section, a determination 
of whether an alien satisfies the age requirement in the matter preceding 
subparagraph (A) of section 1101(b)(1) of this title shall be made using— 
(A) the age of the alien on the date on which an immigrant visa number 
becomes available for such alien (or, in the case of subsection (d) of this 
section, the date on which an immigrant visa number became available 
for the alien’s parent), but only if the alien has sought to acquire the 
status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence within one 
year of such availability; reduced by 
(B) the number of days in the period during which the applicable petition 
described in paragraph (2) was pending. 
(2) Petitions described 
The petition described in this paragraph is— 
(A) with respect to a relationship described in subsection (a)(2)(A) of 
this section, a petition filed under section 1154 of this title for 
classification of an alien child under subsection (a)(2)(A) of this section; 
or 
(B) with respect to an alien child who is a derivative beneficiary under 
subsection (d) of this section, a petition filed under section 1154 of this 
title for classification of the alien’s parent under subsection (a), (b), or 
(c) of this section. 
(3) Retention of priority date 
If the age of an alien is determined under paragraph (1) to be 21 years of age 
or older for the purposes of subsections (a)(2)(A) and (d) of this section, the 
alien’s petition shall automatically be converted to the appropriate category 
and the alien shall retain the original priority date issued upon receipt of the 
original petition. 
(4) Application to self-petitions 
Paragraphs (1) through (3) shall apply to self-petitioners and derivatives of 
self-petitioners. 
8 U.S.C. § 1153(h). 
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remain eligible for the original visa until it became available.103  In the 
House Report accompanying the first version of the CSPA, the Committee 
on the Judiciary stated that the bill’s purpose was to modify the INA “by 
providing that the alien’s status as a child is determined as of the date on 
which the petition to classify the alien as an immediate relative is filed.”104  
The CSPA underwent subsequent changes as the bill was referred to the 
Senate, incorporating retention of child status for children of permanent 
residents, family and employer-sponsored immigrants, diversity lottery 
winners, and refugees and asylees.105
2.  Legislative Intent:  Administrative Delay, Visa Demand, 
and Displacement 
 
One undisputed reason why Congress enacted the CSPA was because it 
recognized enormous backlogs in processing and adjudication of visa 
petitions and applications.106  These delays resulted in the aging out of 
child beneficiaries of visa petitions, who would often turn twenty-one 
before their applications were processed.107  Because these applicants had 
aged out of visa eligibility, they were forced to shift into a lower preference 
category and were placed at the bottom of the long visa waiting list.108  The 
legislative history emphasized these administrative delays.109
Members of the House of Representatives and the Senate expressed 
concern that administrative delay and the ensuing age-out problem were 
separating families.
 
110
 
 103. See id. 
  Senator Diane Feinstein, who introduced the bill in 
 104. H.R. REP. NO. 107-45, at 1–2. 
 105. See 147 CONG. REC. 9954 (2001). 
 106. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. 5239 (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (noting that the INS 
had faced a dramatic increase in the number of visa applications filed, and when combined 
with slow service and filing systems, current waits for adjudications ranged from three to 
five years). 
 107. See Bolvito v. Mukasey, 527 F.3d 428, 436 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[A] qualifying familial 
relationship that is terminated due to . . . ‘aging out’ . . . no longer entitles the derivative 
[beneficiary] to accompanying or following to join benefits.”) (quoting 3 CHARLES GORDON 
ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE § 37.05[2][a] (2004)). 
 108. See id. at 435–36; Cardoso v. Reno, 216 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2000) (prior to the 
enactment of the CSPA, alien aged out of eligibility while application to adjust status was 
pending adjudication).  This also applied to derivative beneficiaries who married while their 
visa petitions were pending. See BOSWELL, supra note 7, at 136.  The aging-out problem is at 
issue in the current litigation, however, and thus is the focus of this Note. 
 109. H.R. REP. NO. 107-45, at 1–2; 147 CONG. REC. 9955 (2001) (statement of Rep. 
Jackson-Lee) (“[S]ome sons and daughter of citizens . . . have to stay on a waiting list from 2 
to 13 years entirely because the INS did not in a timely manner process the applications for 
adjustment of status on their behalf.”); id. at 9954 (statement of Rep. Sensbrenner) (“If a 
U.S. citizen parent petitions for a green card for a child before that child turns 21, but the 
INS does not get around to processing the adjustment of status application until after the 
child turns 21, the family is out of luck.”); id. at 9955 (statement of Rep. Smith) (“Children 
of citizens are penalized because it takes the INS an unacceptable length of time—often 
years—to process adjustment of status applications.”). 
 110. See 147 CONG. REC. 9955 (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) (“We believe that this 
will reunite families.”); 148 CONG. REC. 13,744 (2002) (statement of Rep. Sensbrenner) 
(“[The CSPA] facilitates and hastens the reuniting of legal immigrants’ families.”). 
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the Senate, observed that emigrating parents whose children’s applications 
had been pending for years had to decide whether to come to the United 
States and leave a child behind, or “remain in their country of origin and 
lose out on their American dream in the United States.”111  She explained 
that LPRs who already lived in the United States faced a similar separation 
dilemma.  They had to choose whether to send their child who had aged out 
of visa eligibility back to his or her country of origin, or to have their child 
remain in the United States in violation of U.S. immigration laws, and 
therefore vulnerable to removal.112  Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee, the 
Act’s co-sponsor, noted that the CSPA was intended to solve “the age out 
problem without displacing others who have been waiting patiently in other 
visa categories.”113
Unlike the members of the House of Representatives, Senator Feinstein 
did acknowledge delays caused by visa demand as well as agency 
processing time.  She observed that a child might be unable to immigrate 
“either because the INS was unable to adjudicate the application before the 
child’s 21st birthday, or because growing immigration backlogs in the 
immigration visa category caused the visa to be unavailable before the child 
reached his 21st birthday.”
 
114  Following the Senate amendment, there was 
additional discussion in the House about USCIS processing delays before 
the bill was passed.115
3.  The CSPA Formula in Practice 
 
Under the CSPA, the calculation for determining the age of the child 
beneficiary is done via a subtraction formula.  The child’s age freezes as of 
the date that the visa became available for the relevant petition, reduced by 
the number of days that the petition was pending, but only if the child 
applied for LPR status within one year of the date that the visa became 
available.116  If the resulting number is less than twenty-one years, the 
person may proceed as if he or she were still a “child” under the INA.117
 
 111. 147 CONG. REC. 5239 (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
  
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 9955 (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee). 
 114. Id. at 5239 (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
 115. See 148 CONG. REC. 13,743 (statement of Rep. Sensbrenner) (“The Senate bill 
addresses three other situations where alien children lose immigration benefits by ‘aging out’ 
as a result of INS processing delays.”); id. at 13,744 (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) (“The 
Senate expanded this bill to cover other situations where alien children lose immigration 
benefits by aging out as a result of INS processing delays.”); id. at 13,745 (statement of Rep. 
Gekas) (“The bill was modified in the Senate to provide relief to other children who lose out 
when the INS takes too long to process their adjustment of status applications . . . .”). 
 116. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1)–(2) (2006).  For example, suppose a U.S. citizen filed an 
I-130 for an alien relative on November 1, 2003.  USCIS approved this petition on 
November 14, 2003, and a visa became available on November 14, 2011.  The application 
would be “pending” with the agency for 14 days.  Thus, to determine whether the 
beneficiary or derivative beneficiary was still a “child” by the terms of the CSPA would 
require subtracting 14 days from his age on November 14, 2011. 
 117. See Howard W. Gordon & Tina R. Niedzwiecki, CSPA:  Leaving No Child Behind?, 
in 1 IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 289, 291 (2003–2004 ed.).  A 
Department of State cable issued in 2003 includes a sample worksheet to calculate a child’s 
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This formula differs from other sections of the CSPA, which freeze the age 
of minors at the petition’s filing date.118
Subsection (h)(1) of the CSPA provides a formula for determining the 
age of a family-preference petition’s beneficiary, referencing subsections 
(a)(2)(A) and (d) of § 1153, both of which concern children.
 
119  This 
formula reduces the beneficiary’s biological age by “the number of days in 
the period during which the applicable petition” was pending120—that is, 
the number of days between when the beneficiary filed the petition with 
USCIS and when the agency approved it.  In this way, subsection (h)(1) 
“ensures that an alien does not lose ‘child’ status solely because of 
administrative delays in the processing of an otherwise valid petition.”121  It 
does not address the more extensive delays that often occur between when a 
petition is approved by USCIS and when a visa becomes available.122
Subsection (h)(2), “Petitions described,” highlights two sets of visa 
petitions to which subsection (h)(1)’s formula pertains.  Subsection (2)(A) 
refers to F2A petitions for children of LPRs,
 
123 while subsection (2)(B) 
refers to any family-based, employment-based, or diversity-based visa 
petition for which a child is a derivative beneficiary.124
Subsection (h)(3), “Retention of priority date,” refers to aliens who are 
twenty-one or over even after subsection (h)(1)’s subtraction formula is 
calculated.  In this situation, “the alien’s petition shall automatically be 
converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original 
priority date issued upon receipt of the original petition.”
 
125  This is notably 
distinct from the relief provided by subsection (h)(1), which permits an 
aged-out alien to retain visa eligibility as a “child” using the original 
petition filed on their behalf.126  In contrast, relief under paragraph (3) 
allows the alien to move into a different visa category by automatically 
converting her petition, even as an adult.127  She is also entitled to priority 
date retention for her original petition.128
In practice, the CSPA formula prevents a minor beneficiary from 
winding up at the end of the extensive visa waiting list, even after she has 
 
 
age under the CSPA. See Child Status Protection Act:  ALDAC 2, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 
17, 2003), http://travel.state.gov/visa/laws/telegrams/telegrams_1369.html. 
 118. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(f) (freezing the age of a child of a U.S. citizen to the filing date of 
the petition); § 1158(b)(3)(B) (preventing children listed on asylum petitions from aging out 
of derivative status). 
 119. § 1153(h)(1).  Subsection (a)(2)(A) makes visas available to “children of an alien 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” § 1152(a)(2)(A).  Subsection (d) allows visas to 
be issued to “child[ren] . . . if accompanying or following to join, the . . . parent.” § 1152(d). 
 120. § 1153(h)(1). 
 121. Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 656 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2011).  
 122. Id.  In the example from note 116, supra, the beneficiary or derivative beneficiary’s 
age would not be reduced to reflect the seven-year wait between November 15, 2003 and 
November 15, 2011. 
 123. § 1153(h)(2)(A). 
 124. § 1153(h)(2)(B). 
 125. § 1153(h)(3). 
 126. § 1153(h)(1). 
 127. § 1153(h)(3). 
 128. See id. 
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turned twenty-one.  The beneficiary does not have to file a new petition, but 
rather, may retain her original priority date while moving into the queue for 
a lower preference category.  The CSPA thus remedies “the often harsh and 
arbitrary effects of the age-out provisions under the previously existing 
statute.”129
D.  Judicial Review of Agency Action 
 
The specific contention that the circuit courts have addressed is which 
family-preference categories § 1153(h)(3)’s priority date retention provision 
includes.  The BIA, which administers the CSPA, has determined that this 
provision provides age-out protection only to F2A petitions.130
1.  The Administrative Procedure Act 
  If the 
agency’s interpretation is entitled to deference, then the petitioners in the 
cases at issue would have no remedy in the courts.  It is therefore 
imperative to provide an overview of the legal theory underlying judicial 
deference to agency action. 
The Administrative Procedure Act131 (APA) describes what procedures a 
court must employ in its review of agency decisions.  The court’s review 
follows different procedures depending on whether the questions are ones 
of law or fact.132  In the relevant cases, the facts are not disputed by the 
parties.  Rather, the statutory issue the courts have confronted is purely a 
question of law:  the appropriate interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3).  
Under the APA, a final agency action can be set aside only if it is “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law.”133  A decision is arbitrary and capricious if the agency “has relied on 
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to 
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its 
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so 
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the 
product of agency expertise.”134
2.  Chevron Deference and Its Scope 
 
The seminal case on the scope of judicial review of agency statutory 
construction is the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.135
 
 129. Padash v. INS, 358 F.3d 1161, 1173 (9th Cir. 2004). 
  In Chevron, the Court 
articulated two inquiries that a court should perform in evaluating an 
 130. See infra notes 178–82 and accompanying text. 
 131. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006). 
 132. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B)–(C) (describing questions of law); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E)–
(F) (describing questions of fact). 
 133. § 706(2)(A). 
 134. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983). 
 135. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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agency’s interpretation of a statute that it administers.136  First, the court 
must ask whether “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the 
specific issue.”137  If the statute addresses the issue and “the intent of 
Congress is clear,” the court and the agency must give effect to that 
legislative intent.138  But if Congress “has not directly addressed the precise 
question at issue,” and consequently the statute is silent or ambiguous, then 
the court must proceed to the second step of analysis.139  At that point, the 
court must give some deference to the agency’s interpretation of the 
statute.140  The critical inquiry then becomes whether “the agency’s answer 
is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”141  If this construction 
is a “reasonable policy choice for the agency to make,” then a court must 
defer to the agency’s interpretation of the statute.142
Over the nearly two decades since the Chevron decision, judicial and 
academic discourse has presented many views of how and when such 
deference should apply.  The broadest version, advocated by Justice 
Antonin Scalia, requires Chevron deference to all agency decisions that are 
“authoritative.”
 
143  Deference is then accorded to all determinations that the 
agency makes, even those concerning the scope of its own “jurisdiction.”144
Other understandings of Chevron may qualify this expansive view.
 
145  A 
prior inquiry may take place before the Chevron framework is applied at all.  
This stage, deemed “Chevron Step Zero,”146 stipulates that the statute must 
affirmatively delegate the agency rule making authority in each case.147
 
 136. Id. at 842. 
  In 
 137. Id. at 843. 
 138. Id. at 842–43. 
 139. Id. at 843. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 845.  Step Two of Chevron analysis is generally concerned with the “arbitrary, 
capricious and abuse of discretion” test of the APA and an examination of reasonableness. 
See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611, 
621 (2009) (“Courts and commentators have converged on an emerging consensus that the 
‘arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion’ standard set forth in [APA] Section 706(2)(A) 
supplies the metric for judicial oversight at Chevron’s second step.”); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006) (describing “permissible” as whether the 
agency’s interpretation is “reasonable in light of the underlying law”). 
 143. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 
343 (6th ed. 2006); United States v. Mead Corp. 533 U.S. 218, 257 (2001) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). See generally Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511. 
 144. BREYER ET AL., supra note 143, at 343. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Professors Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman introduced the term 
“Chevron Step Zero” as the initial inquiry to determine whether Chevron applies. See 
Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 
(2001).  For an in-depth examination of Chevron Step Zero analysis, see Sunstein, supra 
note 142. 
 147. See, e.g., Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226–27 (holding that a tariff classification could 
not receive Chevron deference because there was no indication that Congress intended such 
a ruling to carry the force of law); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) 
(holding that opinion letters and “interpretations contained in policy statements, agency 
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addition, courts may use canons of statutory construction at the expense of 
true Chevron analysis.148  While courts in this situation claim to be 
adhering to the Chevron standard, sources such as legislative history, other 
statutes, and policy considerations are at the heart of these opinions.149  The 
use of these “traditional tools of statutory construction,”150 remains a matter 
of judicial debate.151
In the context of immigration, the Supreme Court has specifically 
recognized “that the BIA should be accorded Chevron deference as it gives 
ambiguous statutory terms ‘concrete meaning through a process of case-by-
case adjudication.’”
 
152  Each of the federal district courts and circuit courts 
that have considered the statutory question that is the focus of this Note 
have quickly concluded that Chevron applies, and proceeded to use its two-
prong test.153  At Chevron Step One, the circuits have first looked to 
§ 1153’s plain language, but have also employed canons of statutory 
interpretation including textual structure, other statutory provisions, and 
legislative history to determine whether Congress’s intent was ambiguous 
or clear.154
 
manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant 
Chevron-style deference”). 
  It is at this point, however, that the circuit courts have parted 
ways. 
 148. See BREYER ET AL., supra note 143, at 343. 
 149. Id.; see also Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004) 
(“[Chevron] deference to [an agency’s] statutory interpretation is called for only when the 
devices of judicial construction have been tried and found to yield no clear sense of 
congressional intent.”); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 
U.S. 687, 703 (1995) (discussing Chevron towards the conclusion of the opinion only to 
suggest that the Court owes “some degree of deference” to the agency’s reasonable 
interpretation). 
 150. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 
(1984). 
 151. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 454 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(noting that if courts substitute their interpretation of a statute for an agency’s through the 
use of interpretive canons, “this approach would make deference a doctrine of 
desperation . . . .  This is not an interpretation but an evisceration of Chevron.”). 
 152. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (quoting Cardozo-Fonesca, 480 
U.S. at 448 (majority opinion)).  The Court’s decision in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. 218 (2001), however, creates uncertainty about whether all interpretations adopted in 
adjudication necessitate deference. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 146, at 842–43; see, 
e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009) (holding that because the BIA did not exercise 
its interpretative authority and fully consider a statutory question, Chevron deference was 
unwarranted). 
 153. See Khalid v. Holder, 655 F.3d 363, 366 (5th Cir. 2011) (“As to the BIA’s 
interpretation of immigration statutes, we defer to the BIA to the extent prescribed by 
Chevron’s two-step analysis.” (citing Singh v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 
2006))); Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 656 F.3d 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The parties 
dispute whether aged-out derivative beneficiaries of F3 and F4 petitions are entitled to this 
relief.  To answer this question, we undertake our Chevron analysis.”); Li v. Renaud, 654 
F.3d 376, 382 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Pursuant to its delegated authority, the BIA interpreted the 
INA in a formal adjudication.  Therefore we evaluate the BIA’s interpretation according to 
[Chevron].” (citing Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424–25)). 
 154. See infra Part II.B. 
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II.  THE CURRENT CSPA CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Part II details the BIA’s interpretation of § 1153(h)(3).  In Matter of 
Wang, the BIA narrowly interpreted § 1153(h)(3) by holding that its 
priority date retention and automatic conversion provisions do not apply to 
a derivative beneficiary of a fourth preference family-based visa petition.155
A.  The BIA’s Precedential Decision in Matter of Wang 
  
Subsequently, the Second, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits considered whether the 
provision applies to F3 and F4 petitions, and therefore grants age-out 
protection to derivative beneficiaries of these petitions.  This part discusses 
the BIA’s interpretation in Wang before addressing each circuit court’s 
decision in turn. 
On March 25, 2008, the director of USCIS’s California Service Center 
approved a F2B visa petition filed by an LPR on behalf of his unmarried 
daughter.156  The director denied the petitioner’s request, however, to 
assign an earlier priority date to this petition.157  That earlier priority date 
came from a previous F4 petition of which his daughter was a derivative 
beneficiary.158  By the time the petitioner was admitted to the United States 
using the F4 petition’s priority date, his daughter had aged out of child 
status.159  Although the director refused to approve the earlier priority date, 
because she was uncertain about the scope of age-out protection under the 
CSPA, she certified her decision to the BIA for review.160
In Wang, the BIA considered whether an aged-out derivative beneficiary 
of an F4 visa petition may automatically convert her status to the F2B 
category pursuant to CSPA section 203(h), while retaining the original 
petition’s priority date.
 
161  While the BIA had previously evaluated this 
issue in a non-precedential opinion, Garcia,162 here it examined the 
statute’s language, regulatory framework, and legislative history.163  The 
three-member panel ultimately concluded that the Act did not provide relief 
to Wang’s daughter because she had been a derivative beneficiary of an F4 
family-based visa petition.164
As a preliminary matter, the Board examined the structure of 
§ 1153(h)(1) to (3).  It determined that paragraphs (1) and (2) “when read in 
tandem clearly define the universe of petitions that qualify for the [CSPA 
formula],” in contrast to the text of paragraph (3), which “does not 
expressly state which petitions qualify for automatic conversion and 
 
 
 155. Wang, 25 I. & N. Dec. 28, 39 (B.I.A. 2009). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 28–29. 
 159. Id. at 29. 
 160. Id. at 30. 
 161. Id. 
 162. A79 001 587, 2006 WL 2183654 (B.I.A. June 16, 2009). 
 163. See Wang, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 33 n.7. 
 164. Id. at 38–39.  The BIA later denied a motion to reconsider its decision. See Wang, 
A088 484 947 (B.I.A. May 21, 2010). 
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retention of priority dates.”165  After finding that the language of the 
provision was ambiguous, the BIA considered the usage of “conversion” 
and “retention” in other regulations.166  The Board observed that in 
immigration regulations the term “conversion” consistently refers to a visa 
petition that moves from one category to another.167  As a result, the 
beneficiary of that petition transfers her classification but does not need to 
file a new visa petition.168  Similarly, the Board noted that the concept of 
“retention” of priority dates has always been limited to visa petitions filed 
by the same family member, whereas petitions filed by relatives receive 
their own priority dates.169  The BIA assumed that when Congress enacted 
the CSPA, it was aware of how these regulatory terms were commonly 
used.170
The BIA then applied these concepts to the case at hand.  The Board 
determined that when Wang’s daughter aged out from her status as a 
derivative beneficiary on the F4 petition, there was no family preference 
category that her visa could be converted to because there is no category 
that applies to the niece of a U.S. citizen.
 
171  In addition, the new F2B 
petition was filed on the beneficiary’s behalf by a different petitioner—her 
father rather than her aunt.172  The BIA determined that this could not be 
reconciled with the historical usage of the term “retention.”173  The Board 
found that the statutory text did not plainly indicate that as long as a parent 
became an LPR through any visa preference category, all children listed as 
derivative beneficiaries would receive superior priority date status, even for 
new visa petitions that might be filed at any future date.174  Accordingly, 
the BIA examined the statute’s legislative history for clear evidence of 
congressional intent to expand historical use of the terms “automatic 
conversion” and “priority date retention.”175
The Board observed that the CSPA was principally enacted due to 
concern about extensive administrative delays in the processing of visa 
petitions and applications, which resulted in the aging out of beneficiaries 
of petitions filed by U.S. citizens.
 
176  The BIA noted that the Act’s 
legislative history refers generally to the Senate amendment that added 
children of family and employment-based visas and diversity visas, but 
does not illuminate an intention behind these additions.177
 
 165. Wang, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 33. 
  The BIA 
emphasized that the historical record of the CSPA does not provide clear 
 166. Id. at 33–34. 
 167. Id. at 35. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id.; see also Monreal, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 60 (B.I.A. 2001); Devison, 22 I. & N. Dec. 
1362, 1369 (B.I.A. 2001). 
 171. Wang, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 35–36. 
 172. Id. at 36. 
 173. Id. at 38. 
 174. Id. at 36. 
 175. Id. at 36–38. 
 176. Id. at 36–37. 
 177. Id. at 37. 
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evidence that it aimed to address waits due to visa allocation issues, for 
example, the delay connected to priority dates.178  The Board found that if 
automatic conversion and priority date retention for F4 visas were allowed, 
the beneficiary would “jump” to the front of the F2B visa category line, 
thus causing aliens who had been waiting for years to spend even more time 
on line.179  The BIA thus declined to expand automatic conversion and 
priority date retention provisions.  It found that the CSPA does not 
demonstrate “legislative intent to create an open-ended grandfathering of 
priority dates that allow[s] derivative beneficiaries to retain an earlier 
priority date set in the context of a different relationship, to be used at any 
time.”180
The BIA’s decision in Wang, while focused on F4 petitions, effectively 
limits the scope of § 1153(h)(3) to petitions in which the primary or 
derivative beneficiary is the son or daughter of an LPR:  from F2A to F2B 
conversions.
 
181  This is the only type of petition that allows an aged-out 
beneficiary’s petition to “automatically be converted” to an “appropriate 
category” without requiring a different petitioner.182  In this situation, an 
aged-out primary beneficiary of an F2A petition filed by her LPR parent 
can become the beneficiary of a subsequent F2B petition filed by the same 
parent.183  This is also possible for an aged-out derivative beneficiary of an 
F2A petition filed by an LPR parent on behalf of a spouse.184  Aged-out 
derivative beneficiaries of F2B, F3, and F4 petitions, however, are not 
eligible to convert these petitions to a different category without obtaining a 
new petitioner.185
B.  The Circuits Speak 
 
Following the BIA’s decision in Wang, three appellate courts have 
construed the scope of section 1153(h)(3) using the standard of 
administrative deference articulated in Chevron.186
 
 178. Id. at 38. 
  At Chevron Step One, 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 39. 
 181. Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 656 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 182. Id. at 964 (quoting Wang, 25 I. & N. at 33). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id.  F2A petitions may list children as primary or derivative beneficiaries. Id. at 964 
n.6.  In order to reduce visa filing expenses, an LPR may opt to include a child as a 
derivative beneficiary on an F2A petition for a spouse rather than as a primary beneficiary 
on an additional F2A petition. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. These cases involved aged-out derivative beneficiaries of F3 and F4 visa petitions, 
with essentially similar facts to Wang.  Khalid v. Holder, 655 F.3d 363, 365–66 (5th Cir. 
2011), concerned an aged-out derivative beneficiary who had entered the U.S. on a visitor’s 
visa as a young child.  His application for adjustment of status was denied by USCIS, who 
subsequently initiated removal proceedings. Id. at 366.  In contrast, the plaintiffs in Cuellar 
de Osorio and Li v. Renaud were parents whose children aged out of derivative status due to 
lengthy visa wait times and were no longer eligible to immigrate to the United States. See 
Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 957–59; Li v. Renaud, 654 F.3d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 2011).  The 
minor factual distinctions between these cases, however, have no impact on the interpretive 
question faced by the courts. 
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the courts have relied on tools of statutory interpretation after their 
examination of the plain text.187
1.  The Second Circuit 
  The Second and Fifth Circuits concluded 
that congressional intent is clear and thus no deference to the BIA is 
warranted.  While the Second Circuit found that there was not an 
appropriate category for petitions to convert to other than those in the F2A 
category, the Fifth Circuit held that all derivative beneficiaries of family-
based petitions are entitled to relief under § 1153(h)(3).  In contrast, the 
Ninth Circuit determined that § 1153(h)(3) was ambiguous, and proceeded 
to Chevron Step Two, where it found that the BIA’s interpretation of the 
statute was permissible. 
In Li v. Renaud,188 the Second Circuit became the first appellate court to 
consider the reach of § 1153(h)(3) of the CSPA.  The district court had 
found that § 1153(h)(3) was ambiguous because it did not explicitly define 
which petitions were eligible for automatic conversion and priority date 
retention.189  The Second Circuit contended that for Chevron purposes, 
however, “an alleged ambiguity in some part of the statutory provision at 
issue does not end the inquiry.”190  Rather, at Chevron Step One, a 
reviewing court must ask whether Congress has addressed the “precise 
question at issue” in enacting the provision.191  The court found that 
Congress’s intent clearly prohibits a derivative beneficiary who ages out of 
a family preference petition from retaining the priority date of that petition 
if it cannot be converted to an “appropriate category.”192  Accordingly, the 
Second Circuit concluded that deference to the BIA’s interpretation of 
§ 1153(h)(3) was not warranted.193
In evaluating whether the derivative beneficiary was entitled to age-out 
protection under the CSPA, the court first examined the provision’s textual 
structure.
 
194  The court construed § 1153(h)(3) as a straightforward 
sentence construction—“if X, [then] A and B.”195
 
 187. See Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 961 (“Our first charge under Chevron is to 
ascertain, by ‘employing traditional tools of statutory construction,’ whether ‘Congress had 
intention on the precise question at issue.” (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984))); see also Khalid, 655 F.3d at 366 (“To 
determine whether a statute is ambiguous, we employ the ‘traditional tools of statutory 
construction.’” (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9)); Li, 654 F.3d at 382–83 (also using 
“the traditional tools of statutory construction”). 
  If the alien’s age is 
calculated as twenty-one years or above without the USCIS processing 
delay, then “[A] the alien’s petition shall automatically be converted to the 
appropriate category and [B] the alien shall retain the original priority date 
 188. Li, 654 F.3d 376. 
 189. Li v. Renaud, 709 F. Supp. 2d 230, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 654 F.3d 376. 
 190. Li, 654 F.3d at 382. 
 191. Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842). 
 192. Id. at 383. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See id. 
 195. Id. 
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issued upon receipt of the original petition.”196  The Second Circuit 
explained that while in some circumstances it is possible that the word 
“and” means “or” in a statute, Congress deliberately constructed the 
provision at issue in order to prevent that outcome.197  Congress could have 
allowed beneficiaries to seek (1) conversion, (2) retention, or (3) both 
conversion and retention, but had in fact specified automatic conversion to 
an appropriate category and retention of the initial priority date.198
The court pointed to section 6 of the CSPA, codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1154(k), which separates conversion and retention benefits so that a 
beneficiary may choose whether or not to convert the petition.
 
199  The court 
noted that this provision allows a beneficiary to avoid a conversion that 
would place them in a longer queue in another preference category.200  
Prior to the enactment of the CSPA, when a sponsoring parent of an adult 
son or daughter naturalized and became a U.S. citizen, the petition was 
converted from the F2B to the F1 category.201  This conversion forced sons 
and daughters of Filipino immigrants to wait in a longer visa waiting 
line.202  Under current law, if an LPR files a F2B visa, and the LPR then 
naturalizes before his or her unmarried son or daughter receives a visa, then 
the petition “shall be converted” to an F1 petition.203  The following 
paragraph, however, plainly states that the beneficiary may “elect[] not to 
have such conversion occur (or if it has occurred, to have such conversion 
revoked).”204  Finally, § 1155(k)(3) provides that “[r]egardless of whether a 
petition is converted under this subsection or not,” the beneficiary can retain 
the original petition’s priority date.205
The Second Circuit noted that these statutory provisions specify that 
conversion is elective, and that a beneficiary is entitled to maintain the 
priority date of the initial petition whether or not conversion occurs.
   
206  
Conversion and retention thus represent “distinct and independent” benefits 
in § 1154(k)(3), but comprise joint benefits in § 1153(h)(3).207  The court 
contended that because the two provisions were within the same statute, 
“Congress was aware of the possibility of making the benefits [in 
§ 1153(h)(3)] ‘distinct and independent’ and we cannot assume that 
Congress unintentionally failed to do so.”208
Because the Second Circuit concluded that congressional intent required 
automatic conversion and original priority date retention in § 1153(h)(3), it 
next considered whether automatic conversion was possible for a derivative 
 
 
 196. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) (2006)). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 107-807, at 55–56 (2003)). 
 202. Id. 
 203. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(k)(1) (2006). 
 204. § 1154(k)(2). 
 205. Li, 654 F.3d at 383 (quoting § 1154(k)(3)). 
 206. See id. at 383–84. 
 207. See id. at 384. 
 208. Id. 
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beneficiary of an F3 petition.209  Here, the court followed the lead of the 
BIA and looked to the historical usage of these terms.  The court noted that 
in other immigration regulations, the phrase “automatically be ‘converted to 
the appropriate category’” must refer to when the category of the petition is 
altered but where the identity of the petitioner is not.210  For example, 
8 C.F.R. § 204.2(i) specifies three examples where a petition converts from 
one category to another:  the beneficiary’s change in marital status, the 
beneficiary’s attainment of age twenty-one, and the petitioner’s 
naturalization.211  In each of these situations, the petitioner is unchanged.212  
The Second Circuit concluded that this is also seen in various provisions in 
the CSPA; in every occurrence where the word “conversion” is used, it 
describes a change from one category to another, but this change does not 
include a new petition.213  The court noted that § 1153(h)(3) in particular 
precisely states that conversion is “to the appropriate category” but not to an 
additional petition filed by a new relative.214  Although the Second Circuit 
did not apply Chevron deference,215 it agreed in effect with the BIA that 
there was no “appropriate category” to which to convert a derivative 
beneficiary’s visa petition, and that therefore the CSPA does not extend to 
aged-out derivative beneficiaries of petitions not in the F2A category.216
2.  The Ninth Circuit 
 
The Ninth Circuit considered the applicability of § 1153(h)(3) to 
aged-out derivative beneficiaries of F3 and F4 petitions in Cuellar de 
Osorio v. Mayorkas.217  In contrast to the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit 
found that congressional intent was unclear at Chevron Step One.218  At 
Chevron Step Two, because the Ninth Circuit determined that the BIA’s 
interpretation was reasonable, the court afforded deference to the BIA.219
At Chevron Step One, the court first addressed the statute’s plain 
language.  The Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s argument that the 
word “petition” in paragraph (3) was ambiguous because it did not specify 
exactly which petitions it encompassed.
 
220
 
 209. See id. 
  The court explained that this 
was not required because paragraph (3)’s initial clause is subject to the 
 210. See id. (quoting § 1153(h)(3)). 
 211. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(i)(1)–(3) (2011). 
 212. Li, 654 F.3d at 384. 
 213. See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1151(f)(2) as providing “conversion from F2A to 
immediate relative petition,” § 1151(f)(3) as providing “conversion from F3 to F1 or from 
F3 to immediate relative petition,” and § 1154(k)(1) as providing “conversion from F2B to 
F1”). 
 214. Id. 
 215. See id. at 383. 
 216. See id. at 385. 
 217. 656 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2011).  This case consolidated two appeals from the Central 
District of California:  Cuellar de Osorio’s case and Costelo v. Chertoff, 258 F.R.D. 600 
(C.D. Cal. 2009), a separate class action lawsuit. See Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 958–59. 
 218. Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 963. 
 219. Id. at 965. 
 220. See id. at 961. 
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activation of paragraph (1)’s subtraction formula.221  In other words, only if 
the age-reduction calculation in paragraph (1) determines that an alien is 
twenty-one or above will paragraph (3) then be activated.222  According to 
the court, “the alien” referenced in paragraph (3) must be the one described 
in paragraph (1).223  Therefore, “the alien’s petition” must relate to the 
“applicable petition” described in paragraph (1)(B).224  The court reasoned 
that if the alien had a petition that was not an “applicable petition” as 
defined in paragraph (1), there would be no purpose in performing the 
paragraph (1) calculation.225
The court also observed that the “applicable petition” discussed in 
paragraph (1) is defined by referring to the following paragraph.
 
226  
Paragraph (2) describes F2A petitions for a child as well as all family 
preference petitions that list a child as a derivative beneficiary.227  Thus, 
paragraph (3) allows all of these petitions automatic conversions to the 
appropriate preference category and retention of the original priority 
date.228
Although the Ninth Circuit found that § 1153(h)’s language was clear, it 
still determined that paragraph (3)’s meaning was ambiguous because its 
plain language would lead to “unreasonable or impracticable results” if 
applied to some of the petitions included in paragraph (2).
 
229  First, the 
court observed that the phrase “the alien’s petition shall automatically be 
converted to the appropriate category” implies that there is only one petition 
filed by one petitioner on behalf of one beneficiary, which then moves into 
a different category.230  This reading not only corresponds with the ordinary 
meaning of the word “automatic,” but also reflects existing regulatory 
procedure.231  Like the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit cited to 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.2(i), contending that “automatic” reclassification occurs in these 
contexts with a change in definition of the parties relationship, but not with 
a change in their identities.232
 
 221. See id. 
 
 222. See id.  The court used the example of Rosalina Cuellar de Osorio’s case to illustrate 
its view of how paragraphs (1) and (3) relate to each other. See supra notes 1–10 and 
accompanying text.  The F3 petition of which Cuellar de Osorio was a direct beneficiary was 
filed on May 5, 1998 and approved by USCIS on June 30, 1998. Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d 
at 961 n.4.  Therefore, it was pending adjudication by the agency for 56 days. Id.  Cuellar de 
Osorio’s son, who was listed as a derivative beneficiary on this petition, was born on July 
18, 1984. Id.  When Cuellar de Osorio’s priority date became current on November 1, 2005, 
and a visa became available to her, her son was 26 years and 106 days old. Id.  After 
subtracting the 56 days when his petition was “pending,” his age was 21 years and 50 days. 
Id.  Because he was above the age of 21, this triggered the paragraph (3) calculation. Id. 
 223. Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 961 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1)(B) (2006)). 
 224. Id. (citing § 1153(h)(1)(B)). 
 225. See id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 961–62 (citing Valladolid v. Pac. Operations Offshore, LLP, 604 F.3d 1126, 
1133 (9th Cir. 2010); Avendano-Ramirez v. Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 230. Id. at 962 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) (2006)). 
 231. Id. 
 232. See id. 
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The court noted that in the context of F3 and F4 petitions, however, 
where a derivative beneficiary ages out, there is no “appropriate category” 
to which the petition may “automatically be converted” with the same 
petitioner.233  For example, where a child is a derivative beneficiary of an 
F3 petition, the petitioner is his or her U.S. citizen grandparent.234  When 
the derivative beneficiary turns twenty-one, he or she is no longer able to 
immigrate based on the grandparent’s petition, because such a relationship 
is not recognized under U.S. immigration law.235  Similarly, in the case of 
an F4 petition, the petitioner is the derivative beneficiary’s U.S. citizen aunt 
or uncle.236  After the derivative turns twenty-one, he or she is also 
ineligible to immigrate, because citizen aunts and uncles cannot file 
petitions on behalf of their nieces and nephews.237  At the moment 
paragraph (3) is triggered, automatic conversion into an “appropriate 
category” may be possible for an aged-out F3 or F4 derivative beneficiary 
based on the derivative’s relationship to the primary beneficiary.238  “At 
that point, the derivative’s parent may have obtained LPR status under the 
original . . . petition,” and the aged-out derivative may qualify for the F2B 
category.239  But while this is an accepted relationship, this conversion 
cannot automatically take place, because the LPR parent constitutes a new 
petitioner.240  The court refused to allow aged-out F3 and F4 derivatives to 
convert their petitions to the F2B category, observing that this in effect 
would be to disregard the word “automatically.”241  Because the Ninth 
Circuit found that automatic conversion could not feasibly apply to F3 and 
F4 petitions, the court found that paragraph (3)’s meaning was 
ambiguous.242
Finally, regarding priority date retention, the Ninth Circuit determined 
that congressional intent was unclear on whether priority date retention and 
automatic conversion represented independent benefits.
 
243  The Ninth 
Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit that the text of paragraph (3), which 
contains two grammatically independent clauses, may grant automatic 
conversion and priority date retention as independent benefits.244
 
 233. Id. 
  Yet the 
court contended that this clause could also grant these two benefits jointly, 
as both terms often, although not always, are used in conjunction with one 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. (citing § 1153(a)). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. (citing § 1153(a)). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. See id. 
 241. Id. at 962–63 (citing Miller v. United States, 363 F.3d 999, 1008 (9th Cir. 2004), for 
the proposition that “[c]ourts must aspire to give meaning to every word of a legislative 
enactment.”). 
 242. Id. at 963. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See id. 
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another in family-sponsored immigration regulations.245  Moreover, in 
section 6 of the CSPA, Congress specified that these terms should function 
independently.246
The Ninth Circuit observed that because paragraph (2) may be 
understood as conferring retention and conversion as independent or joint 
benefits, the provision is ambiguous.
 
247  Therefore, the court consulted the 
statute’s legislative history for clear evidence of congressional intent.248  
Because the court determined that there was no record of which derivative 
beneficiaries of family preference petitions qualified for age-out protection 
under the CSPA, it proceeded to Chevron Step Two.249
At Chevron Step Two, the court found that the BIA’s interpretation of 
paragraph (3), which restricted the statute’s applicability to F2A petitions, 
was “permissible.”
 
250  First, the court explained that the Board’s reasoning 
is a plausible construction because it reflects how the word “automatic” is 
normally used, “to describe something that occurs without requiring 
additional input, such as a different petitioner.”251  In addition, the court 
observed that under the BIA’s interpretation, § 1153(h)(3)’s citation to § 
1153(d) does have a demonstrated effect.252  Section 1153(d) entitles a 
beneficiary’s child the same status as his or her parent.253  According to the 
BIA’s construction of § 1153(h)(3), derivative beneficiaries of F2A 
petitions are entitled to age-out protection.254  The court noted that without 
this citation to subsection (d), § 1153(h)(3) would only cover primary 
beneficiaries of F2A petitions, because subsection (a)(2)(A) references only 
the spouses or children of LPRs.255  Prior to the enactment of the CSPA, an 
aged-out derivative beneficiary of an F2A petition received priority date 
retention when an F2B petition was filed on his or her behalf.256  The court 
noted, however, that this regulation does not confer automatic conversion or 
refer to primary beneficiaries of F2A petitions who have aged out.257
In addition, the court disagreed with the petitioner’s argument that the 
BIA’s interpretation in Wang conflicted with Congress’s expressed intent, 
 
 
 245. See id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(i) (2011) as “providing priority date retention with 
automatic conversion” but distinguishing § 204.2(a)(4) as “granting priority date retention 
without automatic conversion”).  
 246. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(k)(3) (2006). 
 247. Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 963. 
 248. Id. (citing United States v. Daas, 198 F.3d 1167, 1174 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 249. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 107-807, at 49–50 (2003)). 
 250. See id. at 964 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). 
 251. Id. 
 252. See id. at 964–65; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) (2006) (referring to “subsections 
(a)(2)(A) and (d)”). 
 253. § 1153(d). 
 254. See Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 964. 
 255. Id. 
 256. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(4) (2011) (“[I]f the [derivative beneficiary of an F2A 
petition] reaches the age of twenty-one prior to the issuance of a visa to the principal alien 
parent, a separate petition will be required.  In such a case, the original priority date will be 
retained if the subsequent petition is filed by the same petitioner.”). 
 257. Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 965. 
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noting that the Act’s House sponsors only addressed age-out protection for 
derivative beneficiaries resulting from processing delays.258  While Senator 
Feinstein had addressed oversubscription problems, she specifically 
referred to children of LPRs, who could be beneficiaries or derivative 
beneficiaries of F2A petitions.259
The Ninth Circuit therefore rejected petitioners’ arguments that the BIA’s 
interpretation was unreasonable because it did not create large scale change 
within the family preference system and went against congressional intent.  
The court advanced a theory of its own, that policy concerns supported the 
BIA’s decision to limit those petitions to which § 1153(h)(3) should 
apply.
 
260  The Ninth Circuit contended that limiting the statute’s 
applicability to F2A petitions is a reasonable policy choice for the BIA to 
make.261  The court explained that if the statute was applied to all derivative 
beneficiaries of family preference petitions, this “would result in a 
fundamental change to the family preference scheme,” because any 
derivative beneficiary of an F3 or F4 petition would be eligible for his or 
her own priority date as the grandchild, niece, or nephew of a U.S. 
citizen.262  American immigration law, however, has never accepted these 
relationships as qualifying under the statutory scheme.263  In contrast, 
derivatives of F2A petitions could also be primary beneficiaries of those 
petitions and therefore receive individual priority dates.264  The Ninth 
Circuit ultimately exercised Chevron deference because the court found that 
it is “not arbitrary or otherwise unreasonable for the BIA’s 
interpretation . . . to draw the line where it does.”265
3.  The Fifth Circuit 
 
Less than a week after the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Cuellar de 
Osorio, the Fifth Circuit became the third appellate court to analyze the 
scope of § 1153(h)(3), in Khalid v. Holder.266  The court held that this 
provision of the CSPA was unambiguous and that an aged-out derivative 
beneficiary of an F4 visa petition was entitled to relief.267  Although the 
Fifth Circuit agreed with the BIA that the statute did not expressly define 
which petitions qualified for age-out protection,268 the court determined 
that congressional intent clearly extended the benefits of § 1153(h)(3) to all 
petitions included in § 1153(h)(2).269
 
 258. See 147 CONG. REC. 9954–55 (2001). 
  The Fifth Circuit thus refused to 
defer to the BIA at Chevron Step One, holding that conversion was possible 
 259. Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 965; see also supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 260. See Cuellar de Osorio, 656 F.3d at 964–65. 
 261. Id. at 965. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. See id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. 655 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 267. See id. at 375. 
 268. Id. at 370. 
 269. See id. at 373. 
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even with a change in petitioner for derivative beneficiaries of all family-
based petitions.270
The court first considered whether the statute was ambiguous by 
examining the plain language of § 1153(h)(1) through (h)(3).
 
271  The Fifth 
Circuit contended that although paragraph (3) does not expressly define 
which petitions qualify for age-out protection, the statutory provisions, 
when taken together, clearly identify which petitions are included within 
§ 1153(h)(3).272  The BIA had discredited paragraph (2), the court found, 
because unlike paragraph (1), paragraph (3) does not directly cite paragraph 
(2).273  However, the court noted that paragraph (3) explicitly refers to 
paragraph (1), and that paragraph (1) then directly cites paragraph (2).274  
The court observed that automatic conversion and priority date retention 
depend on the outcome from the paragraph (1) calculation, which utilizes 
the petitions included in paragraph (2).275  Thus, paragraph (3) necessarily 
depends on the petitions included in paragraph (2), because paragraph (3) 
can only be activated by the operation of paragraph (1).276  Because the 
three subsections are interdependent, they collectively confirm that 
Congress intended paragraph (3) to apply to any alien who “aged out” 
under the paragraph (1) formula and was the beneficiary or derivative 
beneficiary of a petition classified under paragraph (2).277
In addition to § 1153(h)’s overall structure, the Fifth Circuit also 
examined the textual parallels between its subsections.  Paragraphs (1) and 
(3) both use the phrase “[f]or purposes of subsections (a)(2)(A) and (d).”
 
278  
While the BIA had applied paragraph (1)’s formula to derivative 
beneficiaries of F4 petitions under § 1153(d), the court noted that the 
agency had refused to do the same for paragraph (3) even though that 
section had identical wording.279  The Fifth Circuit contended that this 
interpretation conflicts with the canon of construction that “‘identical words 
and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same 
meaning.’”280  The court therefore found that “[t]he traditional canons of 
statutory construction, and the interdependency between subsections (h)(1), 
(h)(2), and (h)(3) compel the conclusion that the ‘[p]etitions described’ in 
h(2) apply with equal force to (h)(1) and (h)(3).”281  As a result, the court 
disagreed with the BIA and determined that the statute, taken as a whole, 
directly answered the question at issue.282
 
 270. Id. at 374–75. 
 
 271. Id. at 370. 
 272. See id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 370–71. 
 275. See id. 
 276. Id. at 371. 
 277. Id. 
 278. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1), (3) (2006). 
 279. Khalid, 655 F.3d at 371. 
 280. Id. (quoting Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232 
(2007)). 
 281. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting § 1153(h)(2)). 
 282. Id. 
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The Fifth Circuit found that the BIA had ignored Congress’s direct intent 
by reviewing the CSPA’s legislative history and regulatory practice 
concerning conversion and priority date retention, but the court refuted 
responses to each of the BIA’s arguments.283  First, the Fifth Circuit 
observed that the legislative history was inconclusive to support the BIA’s 
position because “as is often the case with legislative history, statements 
can be pulled from the record to support the contrary proposition as 
well.”284  The court noted that at least one member of Congress had 
referred to the age-out problem in terms of agency delay as well as visa 
demand.285
Second, although the court accorded greater weight to the BIA’s 
arguments concerning the customary usage of conversion and retention in 
immigration regulations, it still found them unconvincing.
 
286  The court 
noted that the plain language of paragraph (3) provides that conversion 
occurs only after the age-reducing calculation is performed under the 
paragraph (1) formula.287  This cannot be made precisely when the child 
ages out, because the paragraph (1) formula requires the age at which a visa 
becomes available to the alien.288  Only at this point does paragraph (1)’s 
formula become calculable, thereby triggering paragraph (3)’s automatic 
conversion.289  When the derivative beneficiary’s priority date becomes 
current, there is another category available to which to convert the petition 
on the basis of the derivative’s relationship to the primary beneficiary.290
Regarding priority date retention, the Fifth Circuit observed that while in 
the past this practice had required the same petitioner on both the original 
and new petitions, this practice is of “no impediment to Congress enacting a 
law which provides retention of priority dates even where the petitioner is 
different, as it appears to have done here.”
 
291  The court also noted that 
priority date retention is permitted in other immigration contexts that 
involve a change of petitioner, such as for beneficiaries of employment-
based visa petitions, who may retain the original priority date for “‘any 
subsequently filed petition for any classification’ of a new job within three 
major employment categories, regardless of a change in the employer who 
files the petition.”292
 
 283. See id. at 371–73. 
 
 284. Id. at 371. 
 285. Id. at 371–72; see also supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 286. See Khalid, 655 F.3d at 372–73. 
 287. Id. at 372. 
 288. Id. 
 289. See id. 
 290. Id.  The Fifth Circuit noted that the BIA itself had suggested this in Garcia, an 
earlier non-precedential case on the same issue. See A79 001 587, 2006 WL 2183654, at *4 
(B.I.A. June 16, 2006) (“We agree with the respondent that where an [alien] was classified 
as a derivative beneficiary of the original petition, the ‘appropriate category’ for purposes of 
section [1153(h)(3)] is that which applies to the ‘aged-out’ derivative vis-a-vis the principal 
beneficiary of the original petition.”). 
 291. Khalid, 655 F.3d at 372. 
 292. Id. at 372–73; see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(e) (2011). 
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Finally, the Fifth Circuit observed that using the BIA’s reasoning, the 
retention benefit would only apply to converted petitions.293  The court 
noted, however, that if retention was permitted only for petitions that 
“‘automatically . . . converted to the appropriate category,’” paragraph (3) 
would be devoid of meaning.294  This is because there would always be a 
single petition, with the same priority date, and therefore no purpose for a 
clause entitling the alien to “‘retain the date of the original priority date 
issued upon the receipt of the original petition.’”295  Moreover, the court 
found that this language allows for the possibility of two separate petitions 
because it may imply that there is another petition involved that is not the 
original one.296
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that its reading of § 1153(h)(3) could 
create “procedural difficulties” for USCIS, but it determined that this 
potential problem was not the judiciary’s responsibility to resolve.
 
297  
Because the court found that Congress had spoken directly to the 
interpretive problem at issue, it refused to defer to the BIA’s decision in 
Wang.298  The Fifth Circuit held that all derivative beneficiaries may 
convert their family-based visa petitions to an appropriate category, and 
consequently, they are entitled to age-out protection under the CSPA.299
III.  IN DEFENSE OF DEFERENCE:  
ADOPTING THE CUELLAR DE OSORIO INTERPRETATION 
 
Courts should defer to the BIA as the Ninth Circuit did in Cuellar de 
Osorio, and reject both the Second Circuit’s holding in Li and the Fifth 
Circuit’s holding in Khalid.  As an initial matter, this Note agrees with each 
of the circuit courts that Chevron is the appropriate test for this issue of 
statutory interpretation.  It is well settled that BIA decisions are formal 
adjudications that warrant Chevron deference.300  This Note’s analysis 
therefore begins at Chevron Step One, examining the plain language of 
§ 1153(h)(3) and employing the traditional tools of statutory construction in 
order to ascertain congressional intent.301
 
 293. See Khalid, 655 F.3d at 373 (citing In re Crist, 632 F.2d 1226, 1233 n.11 (5th Cir. 
1980) (stating that courts should give effect, whenever possible, “to all parts of a statute and 
avoid an interpretation which makes a part redundant or superfluous”)). 
  Part III first contends at Chevron 
Step One that the text of § 1153(h)(3) is unambiguous.  It concludes, 
however, that the statute itself is ambiguous for three principal reasons:  (1) 
automatic conversion is impracticable for certain petitions; (2) conversion 
and priority date retention may be construed as either joint or independent 
benefits; and (3) the legislative record of the CSPA is not instructive on 
congressional intent.  This part then contends at Chevron Step Two that the 
 294. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3)(2006)). 
 295. See id. (quoting § 1153(h)(3)). 
 296. See id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. See id. 
 299. See id. at 373–74. 
 300. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text. 
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BIA’s interpretation of § 1153(h)(3) is permissible and that, consequently, 
courts should defer to the agency’s decision. 
A.  Chevron Step One:  The Statute Is Ambiguous 
While the text of § 1153(h)(3) when considered in isolation is clear, the 
statutory provision is ambiguous in practice.  First, it does not provide 
conversion automatically for all petitions.  In addition, in spite of whether 
automatic conversion is possible, § 1153(h)(3) is also unclear on whether 
automatic conversion and priority date retention must be applied jointly or 
independently.  Finally, the legislative history of § 1153(h)(3) does not 
demonstrate Congress’s explicit intent to provide age-out protection to 
derivative beneficiaries of family preference petitions.  
1.  The Plain “Language” of § 1153(h)(3) Clearly Allows Conversion 
for All Petitions 
While 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) does not specify which petitions it applies 
to, the statute’s text is straightforward.302  The calculation in paragraph (1) 
prompts the operation of paragraph (3).303  Paragraph (3) cannot function 
independently at the moment the derivative beneficiary turns twenty-one.304  
This is because it is not triggered until paragraph (1)’s subtraction formula 
determines that he or she is over the age of twenty-one even after 
subtracting the pending time of the petition.305  Following this calculation, 
paragraph (3) dictates that “the alien’s petition shall automatically be 
converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original 
priority date issued upon receipt of the original petition.”306
The “alien” described in paragraph (3) must be one within the scope of 
paragraph (1).
 
307  Therefore, “the alien’s petition” must indicate the 
“applicable petition” referenced in paragraph (1)(B).308  If this language 
referred to a different petition, then the paragraph (1) calculation would 
never have been performed, and paragraph (3) would be meaningless.309
In defining the scope of its application, paragraph (1) refers explicitly to 
“the applicable petition described in paragraph (2).”
 
310  Paragraph (2)(A) 
describes F2A petitions for children of LPRs, while paragraph (2)(B) refers 
to family preference petitions for which a child is a derivative 
beneficiary.311
 
 302. See supra notes 
  Thus, the statutory construction of § 1153(h)(1)–(3) can be 
220–28 and accompanying text. 
 303. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1), (3) (2006). 
 304. See id. 
 305. See id. 
 306. § 1153(h)(3). 
 307. See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
 308. See § 1153(h)(1)(B), (3). 
 309. See id. 
 310. § 1153(h)(1)(B). 
 311. § 1153(h)(2). 
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read to encompass all petitions in paragraph (2) and to permit automatic 
conversion and priority date retention for all of these petitions.312
2.  The Statute Does Not Permit Automatic Conversion 
for Petitions Other than F2A Petitions 
 
Although § 1153’s language is clear, the provision in practice is 
ambiguous because paragraph (3) does not make sense when read in 
context.  It does not permit automatic conversion for all family-based visa 
petitions.  The clause “the alien’s petition shall automatically be converted 
to the appropriate category” is consistent with both the common 
understanding of the word “automatic” and with current immigration 
regulatory practice.313  First, the term “automatic” suggests an involuntary, 
mechanized process, and not one that involves an entirely different 
document as well as a different petitioner and different beneficiary.314  In 
similar family-preference situations, only the relationship between the 
parties change, not their identities, so the petition is merely reclassified into 
another category.315  For F2B, F3, and F4 petitions, however, when a 
derivative beneficiary ages out, there is no “appropriate category” for the 
original petition to automatically convert to with the same petitioner.316
3.  It Is Unclear Whether Automatic Conversion 
and Priority Date Retention Are Joint or Independent Benefits 
  
Because automatic conversion is not feasible for these types of petitions, 
§ 1153(h)(3)’s actual meaning must be ambiguous, although its 
“language”—when considering the structural construction only and not the 
lexical context—appears unambiguous.  In short, a structural analysis of the 
statutory language points in one direction, while a contextual analysis of the 
same language points in the opposite direction, resulting in unavoidable 
ambiguity. 
Regardless of whether automatic conversion is permissible, the text of 
§ 1153(h)(3) is also vague with respect to whether priority date retention 
can be applied independently.  The Second Circuit erred in Li by holding 
that Congress clearly intended to make priority date retention and automatic 
conversion joint benefits.317  It is certainly possible to understand paragraph 
(3) as signifying that if the calculation results in an age of twenty-one years 
or older, then “the alien’s petition shall automatically be converted to the 
appropriate category” and “the alien shall retain the original priority date 
issued upon receipt of the original petition.”318
 
 312. § 1153(h)(1)–(3). 
  It is equally reasonable, 
however, to read this paragraph as conferring the two benefits 
 313. See supra notes 231–32 and accompanying text. 
 314. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
 315. See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
 316. See supra notes 233–40 and accompanying text. 
 317. See supra notes 197–98, 208 and accompanying text. 
 318. See supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text. 
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independently, an analysis that is supported by other family-related 
immigration statutes and also within another provision of the CSPA.319
4. The CSPA’s Legislative History Does Not Reveal Congressional Intent 
  
Even though section 6 of the CSPA, § 1154(k), was passed on the same day 
as § 1153(h) and specifically makes conversion and retention independent 
benefits, this analogy cannot resolve the unclear language of § 1153(h)(3), 
which must be ambiguous because it can be interpreted both ways. 
An examination of § 1153(h)(3)’s legislative history does not remedy the 
ambiguity of the statute, as demonstrated by its operation and relation to 
other statutory provisions.  There was no specific discussion by Congress of 
particular age-out protections for derivative beneficiaries of family 
preference petitions.320  The report of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary and statements by various members of the House of 
Representatives express concern over delays in the adjudication process, 
rather than the waiting times associated with numerical limitations.321  
While Senator Feinstein’s remarks indicate her concern about visa demand 
as well as agency delay, she specifically addressed children of LPRs, who 
might be beneficiaries or derivative beneficiaries of F2A petitions.322  In 
addition, the relatively meager legislative history of the Act does not reveal 
a clear congressional intent to increase the number of visas to be allocated 
each year.323  Following the Senate amendment that Senator Feinstein 
sponsored, the Act was returned to the House before its enactment, where 
again there was no discussion of enlarging the number of visas available to 
family-preference immigrants.324
While § 1153(h)(3)’s text is clear, the provision’s operation, statutory 
context, and legislative history are ambiguous.  Therefore, it is appropriate 
to proceed to Chevron Step Two. 
 
B.  Chevron Step Two:  The BIA’s Interpretation Is Not Arbitrary 
or Capricious 
The BIA’s interpretation of § 1153(h)(3) in Wang is “based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.”325  The effect of Wang is to limit 
§ 1153(h)(3) to only one petition type:  F2A.326  This is the only petition 
with an “appropriate category” to which an aged-out primary or derivative 
beneficiary may “automatically be converted” without a change in the 
petitioner’s identity.327
 
 319. See supra notes 
  The BIA’s construction of § 1153(h)(3) does 
restrict conversion and retention to aliens who convert from the F2A 
243–46 and accompanying text. 
 320. See supra notes 109–15 and accompanying text. 
 321. See supra notes 109–10, 113, 115 and accompanying text. 
 322. See supra notes 114, 259 and accompanying text. 
 323. See supra notes 109–15 and accompanying text. 
 324. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 325. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 326. See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text. 
 327. See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text. 
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category, which was already permitted under a preexisting regulation.328  
But this regulation says nothing about automatic conversion, nor does it 
refer to aged-out primary beneficiaries of F2A petitions.329
In addition, as previously discussed, the BIA’s reasoning corresponds 
with the usual practice of the word “automatic,” which describes a process 
that occurs without requiring new components.
  Therefore, the 
BIA’s interpretation of § 1153(h)(3) does result in some change. 
330  The BIA also construed 
“conversion” and “retention” in § 1153(h)(3) consistently with how those 
terms have been used in other immigration statutes and regulations related 
to family-based preferences.331
Importantly, the BIA’s decision in Wang does not conflict with 
Congress’s stated intent.  The CSPA’s legislative history demonstrates that 
Congress enacted the statute in order to provide some form of relief to 
aged-out derivative beneficiaries of family preference petitions.
 
332 All 
derivative beneficiaries receive age-out protection due to administrative 
delays under § 1153(h)(1).333  As noted earlier, the Act’s House sponsors 
referred solely to this protection when they addressed the provisions that the 
Senate had added.334   As the Cuellar de Osorio court observed, “[W]e 
cannot say that the BIA’s interpretation of § 1153(h)(3) is contrary to 
congressional intent simply because it affords additional relief only to 
children in the F2A category.”335
While the legislative record does reflect general congressional statements 
about family unity,
 
336 Congress has in fact often limited preferential 
immigration status for aged-out children.337
it could be argued that the line should have been drawn at a different point 
and that the statutory definitions deny preferential status to parents and 
and children who share strong family ties. . . .  But it is clear from our 
cases . . . that these are policy questions entrusted exclusively to the 
political branches of our Government, and we have no judicial authority 
to substitute our political judgment for that of the Congress.
  As the Supreme Court has 
noted on congressional policy decisions, 
338
If Congress had intended to allow aged-out derivative beneficiaries to 
immigrate with or immediately following their parents, it could have 
eliminated the complicated formula of § 1153(h)(1) and thus the 
controversial conversion procedure of § 1153(h)(3).  As an alternative, 
 
 
 328. See supra note 256 and accompanying text. 
 329. See supra note 257 and accompanying text. 
 330. See supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
 331. See supra notes 166–69 and accompanying text. 
 332. See supra notes 106, 108–10, 115 and accompanying text. 
 333. See supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text. 
 334. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 335. Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 656 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 336. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 337. For example, children cannot qualify for preferential status if they are married or 
twenty-one years of age or older. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (2006); see also supra note 48 
and accompanying text (describing the recognized family-based preference categories). 
 338. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798 (1977). 
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Congress could have frozen the age of all derivative beneficiaries at a 
petition’s filing date, as it did in other sections of the CSPA,339 or allowed 
U.S. citizens and LPRs to directly petition on behalf of their grandchildren, 
nieces, and nephews.340
Limiting § 1153(h)(3)’s applicability to F2A petitions is not arbitrary or 
capricious but “a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make.”
 
341  
Applying § 1153(h)(3) to all aged-out derivative beneficiaries would 
significantly alter the family preference system.342  This change would 
effectively allow aged-out derivatives of F3 and F4 petitions to receive their 
own priority dates based on their status as grandchildren, nephews, and 
nieces of U.S. citizens.343  These beneficiaries, as new entrants in line, 
would then jump ahead of other aliens who had been waiting for visas for 
years.344  The example of “Rose” and “Alice” and their respective children 
demonstrates this potential unfairness.345
Imagine that “Rose” immigrated to the United States in 2000 as the 
primary beneficiary of an immediate relative petition.  Her then-sixteen-
year-old daughter was unable to accompany her because derivative 
beneficiary relationships do not apply to immediate relative petitions.
 
346
In contrast, “Alice” immigrated to the United States in 1994 as the 
beneficiary of an F3 petition.  Her then-nineteen-year-old son was listed as 
a derivative beneficiary on this petition.  When Alice became an LPR 
thirteen years later in 2007, however, her son no longer qualified as a 
“child.”  That year, Alice filed an F2B petition for her then-thirty-two-year-
old son.  If the original 1994 priority date was applied to the more recent 
2007 petition, Alice’s son could immediately receive a visa number. 
  
The following year, Rose filed an F2A petition for her daughter.  When she 
turned twenty-one in 2005, this petition converted to an F2B petition.  
Rose’s daughter is still waiting for her priority date to become current in 
order to apply for a visa. 
In 2007, Alice’s thirty-two-year-old son and Rose’s twenty-three-year 
old daughter were eligible for F2B visas as adult family members of LPRs.  
However, Rose achieved LPR status seven years before Alice and filed her 
F2B petition six years before Alice filed hers.  Rose and her daughter have 
been apart since 2000, but Alice and her son have only been apart since 
2007.  Alice’s son would effectively be jumping ahead of Rose’s daughter 
in line, even though the daughter had been waiting in line in another 
category for many more years. 
 
 339. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 340. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the limits on which relatives 
U.S. citizens and LPRs may petition for under current immigration law). 
 341. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984). 
 342. See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
 343. See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
 344. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 345. This example has been slightly modified from the government’s brief in Cuellar de 
Osorio. See Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 63–64, Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 956 
F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 09-56786, 09-56846). 
 346. See supra note 54. 
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In contrast, the F2A to F2B conversion permitted by the BIA does not 
displace other immigrants in each category’s respective visa queue.  Here, 
the primary or derivative beneficiary in fact transfers from a line with a 
reasonably short waiting time to one that is far longer.  For example, as of 
January 2012, for all countries except Mexico, F2A visas were available for 
beneficiaries with priority dates before April 22, 2009, while F2B visas 
were available only for priority dates before September 8, 2003.347  Thus, 
the wait time for F2B visas was five years longer than the wait time for F2A 
visas.348
The BIA’s construction of § 1153(h)(3) does not conflict with 
congressional intent, but rather preserves the goals of the family preference 
visa system.  It is a practical and reasonable policy choice for the agency to 
make.  Because the agency’s interpretation represents a permissible 
construction of the statute at Chevron Step Two, it warrants Chevron 
deference.
  By permitting automatic conversion from F2A to F2B, 
§ 1153(h)(3) in fact forces the primary and derivative beneficiaries to join a 
line with a longer wait time.  The beneficiaries are not required to start at 
the end of this queue, however, because they are permitted to retain their 
original priority dates. 
349
CONCLUSION 
 
Although the plain language of § 1153(h)(3) is unambiguous, the 
statutory provision does not allow automatic conversion for F2B, F3, and 
F4 petitions.  This ambiguity is not remedied through either an assessment 
of the statute’s legislative history or whether priority date retention serves 
as an independent benefit.  As it is impossible to discern congressional 
intent at Chevron Step One, it is therefore necessary to proceed to Chevron 
Step Two analysis.  The BIA’s interpretation of which family preference 
petitions are entitled to age-out protection under § 1153(h)(3) of the CSPA 
is permissible.  Deferral to the BIA, as advocated by the Ninth Circuit in 
Cuellar de Osorio, is the correct position.  Unless and until Congress 
revises the CSPA to clarify what petitions qualify for age-out protection, or 
allocates additional family preference visas, courts should follow the 
example of the Ninth Circuit and uphold the BIA’s interpretation of 
§ 1153(h)(3). 
 
 
 347. See Visa Bulletin for January 2012, supra note 66, at 2.  For Mexico and the 
Philippines, the difference between the F2A and F2B visa lines was even longer—seventeen 
years and eight years, respectively. Id.  There is a difference in F2A and F2B waiting times 
because, under § 1153(a)(2), at least 77 percent of second preference visas must be allocated 
to the F2A category. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 348. See Visa Bulletin for January 2012, supra note 66, at 2. 
 349. See supra note 265 and accompanying text. 
